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Abstract—We address the problem of assisting hu-
man dispatchers in operating power grids in today’s
changing context using machine learning, with the
aim of increasing security and reducing costs. Power
networks are highly regulated systems, which at all
times must meet varying demands of electricity with
a complex production system, including conventional
power plants, less predictable renewable energies
(such as wind or solar power), and the possibility of
buying/selling electricity on the international market
with more and more actors involved at a European
scale. This problem is becoming ever more challeng-
ing in an aging network infrastructure. One of the
primary goals of dispatchers is to protect equipment
(e.g. avoid that transmission lines overheat) with
few degrees of freedom: we are considering in this
paper solely modifications in network topology, i.e.
re-configuring the way in which lines, transform-
ers, productions and loads are connected in sub-
stations. Using years of historical data collected by
the French Transmission Service Operator (TSO)
“Réseau de Transport d’Electricité" (RTE), we de-
velop novel machine learning techniques (drawing on
“deep learning") to mimic human decisions to devise
“remedial actions" to prevent any line to violate
power flow limits (so-called "thermal limits"). The
proposed technique is hybrid. It does not rely purely
on machine learning: every action will be tested
with actual simulators before being proposed to the
dispatchers or implemented on the grid.
Key words: data science, data mining, power sys-
tems, machine learning, deep learning, imitation
learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity is a commodity that consumers take
for granted and, while governments relaying public
opinion (rightfully) request that renewable ener-
gies be used increasingly, little is known about
what this entails behind the scenes in additional
complexity for the Transmission Service Operators
(TSOs) to operate the power grid in security. In-
deed, renewable energies such as wind and solar
power are less predictable than conventional power
sources (mainly thermal power plants). In cases of
contingency, which may be weather-related (e.g.
decreased production because of less wind or sun
or line failure due to meteorological conditions)
operators (a.k.a. dispatchers) must act quickly to
protect equipment to meet all “security criteria"
(for example to avoid that lines get overloaded).
Remedial actions they take in such situations may
include among others (1) modifications of the
network topology to re-direct power flows, (2)
modification of productions or consumptions (re-
dispatching). By far the least costly and preferred
of these options is the first one, and it will be the
only one considered in this paper. A network is
considered to be operated in “security" (i.e. in a
secure state) if it is outside a zone of “constraints",
which includes that power flowing in every line
does not exceed given limits. The dispatchers must
avoid ever getting in a critical situation, which
may lead to a cascade of failures (circuit breakers
opening lines automatically to protect equipment,
thus putting more and more load on fewer and
fewer lines), ultimately leading to a blackout. To
that end, it is standard practice to operate the grid in
real time with the so-called “N-1 criterion": this is
a preventive measure requiring that at all times the
network would remain in a safe state even if one
component (productions, lines, transformers, etc.)
would be disconnected.
In choosing proper remedial actions, the
dispatchers are facing various trade-offs. Remedial
actions must eliminate the problem they were
designed to address, but also must avoid creating
new problems elsewhere on the grid. Today, the
complex task of dispatchers, which are highly
trained engineers, consists in analyzing situations,
proposing remedial actions, and checking
prospectively their effect using sophisticated (but
slow) high-end simulators, which allow them to
investigate only a few options. Our goal is to
assist the dispatchers by suggesting them with
quality candidate remedial actions, obtained by
synthesizing several years of historical decisions
made in various situations into a powerful
predictive machine learning models, built upon
earlier work [1].
The main contributions of this paper are:
(1) To address a large scale industrial project
with potentially high financial impact using
real historical data and a large-scale simulator
(deployed in real operations) from the company
RTE; (2) To cast the problem in a mathematical
setting amenable to machine learning studies;
(3) To devise a methodology to extract from
historical data and simulations a dataset usable
for training and testing in a supervised machine
learning setting; (4) To suggest and study machine
learning architectures, which automatically
generate candidate remedial actions, which could
be validated with more extensive power system
simulations. The paper is organized as follows:
Section II formalizes the problem. Section III
describes the proposed methodology. Section
IV outlines initial results. Section V presents
a possible integration into today operational
processes. Finally, section VI provides conclusions
and outlooks.
II. FORMALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM.
In this section, we formalize daily real-time
tasks of dispatchers as a formal realistic (yet
simplified) optimization problem, amenable to
mathematical studies. Our setting is inspired by
the analysis found in reference [2]
Suppose that we are studying a powergrid at a
given time t (either the current time for a real-time
study, or some time in the near future for a forecast
study). Let:
‚ Rt be the set of all feasible re-dispatching
actions possible for time t;
‚ and Tt the set of all feasible topological
actions for time t
known at the time of the study.
Let us then assume that we are given a cost func-
tion R (resp. T ), that assigns some cost to any re-
dispatching action ρ PRt (resp. topological action
τ P Tt). For instance, the cost of a redispatching
action can be the money paid by the TSO to the
producers. The cost of a topological action can
include the aging of the breakers, the probability
of failure etc.
We further assume that decisions performed by
dispatchers made for the sake of security of the grid
are optimally efficient, given available information.
They implicitly solve an optimization problem con-
sisting in minimizing the cost of their actions to
meet a security measure S. This can be formalized
with the equation 1:
minimize
pρPRt ,τPTtq
Rpρq`Tpτq
subject to
Spgridt dtρ ,τuq
(1)
where S denotes the function stating whether a
powergrid is in a secure state. More formally, S
should be a function taking a grid as input, and
returning a list of security issues (for example if
the grid is secure according to S, the result should
be the empty set H). We also denote by gridt the
state of the grid at time t. The operator d must be
understood as applying a set of actions on a given
grid: "gridt dtρ ,τu" should be though as The grid
resulting of the application of actions ρ and τ on
the network gridt .
This problem can be very complex to solve. For
instance, it mixes continuous variables (such as
redispatching) and integer variables (for example
the topology or the maximum values allowed for
productions). The number of variables involved is
also quite important. France alone count around
3 000 productions and RTE can act on more
than 30 000 breakers. Solving this problem "as
is" requires to do some hypothesis on the costs
functions and on the type of constraints of the
problem 1 for example to formulate as a Mixed-
Integer Linear Program for which there exist some
suitable solvers.
In this paper, we propose a new methodology,
based on learning of remedial actions taken by
operators. Indeed, learning from human actions has
some advantages:
‚ It will improve the acceptance of the algo-
rithm for dispatcher:
– the proposed actions come from what they
have already done in the past;
– they can use the same tools they use today
to check the validity of the results proposed.
‚ It can indirectly model other security issues
ignored by S. For example, dispatchers may
know that a given breaker is in bad shape.
So, they rarely actuated it. This can be taken
into account by a learning strategy but may
not be as easily digested using optimization
tools (such constraints may be difficult to ex-
press, or difficult to centralized in one unique
Information System Database).
‚ It can help sharing knowledge between dis-
patchers, and capitalizing on the best action
taken.
III. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In this section, we address the problem of finding
curative/remedial actions to protect the power grid
with a novel methodology based on machine learn-
ing. Our methodology is inspired by the game play-
ing literature and in particular the very successful
AlphaGO machine learning program[3] developed
by Google Deepmind to tackle the ancient game
of Go. We detail in this section the first step of
the methodology concerning “imitation learning",
i.e. training a learning machine to imitate decisions
made by experts (expert players for Go and profes-
sional dispatchers for power grids). Improvements
gained by self-play and reinforcement learning are
discussed in Section VI and will be the object of
future work.
However, despite great similarities with the set-
ting of AlphaGO, our problem has features of its
own, which are addressed in this section. First, in
the game playing setting, every action is perpe-
trated by one player with the intention of winning
the game (i.e. pursue the objective at hand). In
contrast, historical actions in power networks may
stem from various motivations, which include pro-
tecting the grid (our objective), but also include
scheduled maintenance actions and various other
maneuvers unrelated to our objective. Because of
the lack of data annotation regarding the purpose
of actions, we must perform sophisticated prepro-
cessing to prepare data suitable for our machine
learning modeling. Second, in a game setting the
risk vs. reward trade-off does not have the same
implications and level of gravity. In power network
applications, much greater levels of care must
be given to assessing potential adverse effects of
proposed actions, possibly discarding those which
may be curing a given problems while triggering
one of several others.
Because of these distinguishing features of the
problem, our methodology for “imitations learn-
ing" is split in two steps, which are described in
this section: (1) Data generation; (2) Learning.
A. Dataset generation: Extracting relevant actions
To train our models, which will imitate human
dispatchers, we need a large dataset of pairs {net-
work state, action taken}. We describe in this sec-
tion the method we used to obtain such a dataset.
Our work builds upon a wealth of data recorded
by RTE. Every 5 minutes, the consistent state of
the grid is archived. We have available data from
November 1st 2011, to present times. For this study,
we use data until 2016 August 7th. For each grid
state, we have access to all the injections (injections
are complex numbers having active power positive
or negative values and reactive power values; they
include both “productions" and “consumptions" or
“loads"). We also know the nodal topology of grid
and the voltage (angle and magnitude) for every
node of the network. Accurate simulators of the
physical grid can compute other quantities, such
as the flows on lines using standard models such
as AC load-flow simulators. This represents ap-
proximately 485 000 snapshots of the French grid:
each snapshot being a modeling of the French Very
High Voltage and High Voltage network counting
more than 11 000 lines, an average of around
6 400 buses, and around 7 000 loads for 3 000
productions.
One pitfall of the data is the lack of annotation
of the actions. Changes in network topology can-
not be only attributable to remedial actions taken
by dispatchers to protect the grid. For example,
we cannot distinguish between corrective actions
performed in response to unplanned contingencies
(e.g. a line struck by lightning) and periodical
maneuvers to check if a breaker can still be open/-
closed. Therefore, to obtain data that is useful for
training, we must perform a “detective work" and
extract from available data plausible remedial ac-
tions by analyzing which action, if not performed,
would have led to an adverse change in network
security.
Of two possible types of actions (re-dispatching
and changes in topology), our main focus here is
on topological actions. This stems from two main
reasons. First, in the literature, some methods have
already been developed to tackle the re-dispatching
problem such method include OPF (Optimal power
flow)[4] or SCOPF (Security Constrained Opti-
mal Power Flow) where [5] present most recent
advances in such area. Second, as we previously
mentionned, TSOs like RTE are more interested
in topological remedial actions because they are
generally less costly.
To isolate the relevant changes in network topol-
ogy, which could correspond to dispatcher actions
responding to a problem or anticipating a situation
that may yield to a problem, we propose an al-
gorithm inspired by counterfactual reasoning [6]:
"What would have happened if a given topological
change τ had not occurred?" To do that, we use
a combination of real data and grid simulation.
We proceed in two steps for which pseudo-code
is provided:
‚ Algorithm 1: Considering two grid states gt ,
and gt`h at times t and t ` h, we check the
potential outcome of not having performed a
change in topology by freezing the network
topology at t while imposing the injections
that were observed in real data at t` h. The
power flows and security criterion S are re-
calculated by simulation. Unsafe networks are
detected when security violations occur, in-
dicating that a topological change may have
played the role of a preventive “remedial
action".
‚ Algorithm 2: Changes in topology occurring
between t and t`h may have been motivated
by other reasons than preventing the network
to go out of its security operation regime (for
reason of maintenance, for example). We post-
process the data by looking for a minimal
subset of actions, which bring the network
back to a safe operation mode.
Input: tgtutminďtďtmax , hmax, S
Output: tpt, h, s, g˜t,hqu
Initialisation :
1: resÐ tu
Main loop :
2: for t P rtmin, tmaxs do
3: for h P r0,hmaxs do
4: create grid g˜t,h with the same injections
than gt`h and the same topology than gt
5: S “ Spg˜t,hq
6: if (S ‰H) then
7: for s P S do
8: res.appendppt, h, s, g˜t,hqq
9: end for
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: return res
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for finding unsafe net-
works. Observed grid states are denoted by gt .
Counterfactual grid states are denoted by g˜t,h.
The output of Algorithm 1 is then a list of
security criteria not met in a stressed network,
and the corresponding time-stamps. The output of
Algorithm 2 is a list of topological changes that
can be applied as remedial actions.
B. Model training: Imitate human experts
Now that we have a clean database with pairs
of {X=stressed state, Y=remedial actions}we can
learn from it. The main idea is to use learning
Input: tgtutminďtďtmax , tpt, h, s, g˜t,hqu, S
Output: tps,τ, g˜qu
Initialisation :
1: resÐtu
Main loop :
2: for t,h,s, g˜ P tpt, h, s, g˜t,hqu do
3: Compute the topological changes between
gt and gt`h, assign it to Γ
4: for τ P subsetpΓq do
5: if not s P Spg˜d τq then
6: res.appendpps, g˜,τqq
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: return res
Algorithm 2: Algorithm for extracting minimal
remedial actions.
machines to quickly propose and/or evaluate ac-
tions by learning from what the human would
have done facing the same situation. This is often
called supervised learning, or imitation learning.
For instance, we may provide our learning machine
with an ensemble of variables X (in our case an en-
coding of the security issue-s- s and the grid g) and
teach it to produce the response Y “ τ . One of the
main difficulties we have to face is that of encoding
information: the structure and state of a power
grid, including representing security issues, and the
actions. We propose and study several methods of
encoding, restraining ourselves to the French power
grid of which we have in depth knowledge. One
of them consists in simply enumerating all the
important variables, for example the productions,
the loads, the flows on each line or the voltage mag-
nitude and angles and encode them with an arbi-
trary “barcode". This first approach main seem too
crude, but has proved useful in combination of deep
learning neural network architectures that we have
explored in our machine learning analyses. This
also demonstrates the robustness of deep learning
techniques to arbitrary input representation and
their capability of learning internal representation
even from unpreprocessed data as shown in [7] for
example. This is a important feature to achieve our
goal: model grid data is a complex task.
As learning machines, several neural network
architectures have been envisioned and will be
compared. One of the most promising ones, for
which we have initial results reported in the next
section and that could serve as benchmark for most
advance study, involves a deep neural network,
which predicts power flows from injections and
topologies, simply coded with their “barcode”. The
benefit of this network is to quickly be able to
evaluate the security status of a proposed power
network topology by calculating S from the neu-
ral network output. Such evaluation of S using
a neural network is orders of magnitude faster
than running the RTE simulator Hades2 (typically
100x for moderate size neural networks used on
moderate size powergrid). Today, this first module
must be combined with another system, which pro-
duces candidate topologies, including topologies
proposed by dispatchers and re-combinations. We
presently have a dictionary of 3 000 topologies
corresponding to preventive “remedial actions". We
envision that this set of remedial actions could be
enriched with the help of data generating models
such as GANs [8] or can be ranked using a learning
algorithm and then tested in real time with the
preferred simulator of the dispatcher.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
The previous algorithm 1 and 2 have been run
through the first six months of 2012. To make
the simulation tractable for a reasonable computer,
some restriction have been imposed some restric-
tions:
a) we impose the window h to be in the ensemble
t 5 min, 10 min, 15 min, 30min, 45 min,
1h, 1h30, 2h, 2h30, 3h, 3h30, 4h, 4h30, 5h,
5h30, 6h, 7h, 8h, 9h, 10h, 11h, 12h, 23h,
23h30, 23h45, 24h u and not on the interval
r0,24hs in algorithm 1. This restriction have
been made in compliance with RTE experts,
and preliminary results that showed a lot of
redundancies.
b) we use a simplify version of the safety
criterion use for operation support S. The
criterion used was that each line of the
network must be bellow 95% of its thermal
limit. The operation safety criterion would
lead to 10 000 times more computation, as
for each security assessment, a simulation
retrieving each line one by one must be
computed.
c) in algorithm 2, only the subset of τ of cardinal
one have been tested. This again is in compli-
ance with the operators: it is quite rare that
people need to act on different substations for
security reason.
Total
g˜t,h computed 1 163 940
g˜t,h unsafe 81 476
g˜t,h with one curative action 17 587
different curative actions 3 266
lines stressed 2 008
lines stressed with a curative action 964
Table I: Results for obtained after launching algo-
rithms 1 and 2 on the six firsts months of 2012.
With this settings, the security around
1 250 000 grids have been computed using
our implementation of algorithm 1 as shown
in the table I (first row). This allowed us to
identify more than 81 000 stressed grids g˜t,h
in an insecure state. On this 81 000 insecure
grids, we noted that 2 008 lines have seen
their flow exceed their thermal limit (fifth row).
This represent around 18% of the total number
of lines present in the grid. This validation is
compliant with expert knowledge of the French
grid: there exists some part weaker than the others.
We can also note that in total, we have found
3 266 unique remedial actions (two remedial
actions are different if and only if they do not
solve an overflow on the same line or if they do
not act on the same substation, of if they do not
change the nodal topology in the same manner).
This means that, in the history, at least 3 266
different topological actions could have been done
for solving a security issue.
With these data collected, we intend to conduct a
systematic comparison of learning machine archi-
tectures to propose and evaluate “remedial actions".
We have first started studying neural network archi-
tectures allowing us to evaluate “remedial actions".
As explained in the previous section, such learning
machines take as input injections and topologies
and predict power flows (which allow us to quickly
calculate S).
Our preliminary study includes testing artificial
neural network for approximating load-flow
of Matpower [9] (test cases "case30" coming
originally from [10] and "case118"1). Using
these power grids we taught the neural networks
to predict the outcome of a given outage. The
neural networks are trained using the Tensorflow
framework. An example of the architecture used to
1This test case "represents a portion of the Ameri-
can Electric Power System (in the Midwestern US) as
of December, 1962". More information can be found at
www2.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/pf118.
approximate the load-flow can be found in figure 1.
pp
pv
cp
cq
cq
enc
.
..
. . . ...
pq
cv
fA
fMW
Figure 1: Representation of the architecture of the
artificial neural network used for the flows approx-
imation. Squares represents input, triangles output
and hidden unit are represented by circle. Each
arrow represent a trainable parameter (weight). The
network architecture is "fully connected": every
unit of a given layer is connected to every unit
of the following layer.
This study has been conducted by first simu-
lating a lot of plausible grid state, making the
injections (productions and consumptions) vary.
The workflow to obtain such a database is the
following:
1) Get the grid in the proper format used by
Hades2
2) Disconnect one line.
3) Sample the active loads based on the 2012
French loads consumptions
4) Sample the reactive loads from the historical
distribution
p
q
calibrated on the French power
grid
5) Sample active productions value from active
loads value:
‚ Disconnect randomly some productions (to
take into account the fact that not all pro-
ductions are functioning at a given time)
‚ dispatch the loads power according pmax
‚ add noise
6) The voltages of the productions are not mod-
ified
Once the data base has been built, it has been
divided in 3. One part (50 %) for training the
model, another one (25%) for fitting the meta
parameters, and at last a third one for testing
and reporting results. The example for which the
results are given are then never seen during any
part of the training.
For each line disconnection, we ran
ns “ 10000 simulations with 10 000 different
productions / loads values. The matpower 30
buses grid count 41 lines, making in total
nslomon
no line are disconnected
`41 ˆ nslomon
one line is disconnected
. For
this grid, the test set counts then 2 100 00
samples. For the bigger 118 buses grid, we
simulate ns “ 5 000 sample per configuration, and
there is 199 lines, so the test set counts 450 000
rows.
In this first experiment, we try to approximate
a load-flow computation. So we feed a neural
network with with an architecture presented in
figure 1: the active cp and reactive cq loads value,
the active production value pp as well as their
voltages setpoints pv as inputs. We also give in
input which line have been disconnected using
a one-hot encoding enc. And we ask the neural
network to predict the rest of the variables: reactive
productions values pq, the voltages at the buses
where each load is connected cv and the flows. For
the flows we decided to make the network compute
the active power flow fMW , and the current power
flow fa. The reactive power flow is not computed.
We note that we did not feed the network with the
pmin or pmax values for the productions. One of the
task of the neural network will be to balance the
loads to take into account the losses for example.
To evaluate the performance of our models, we
will use the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and the
Mean Absolute Percentage Error. If ytrue denotes
the vector (of size n) of the true values, and yˆ the
vector of the predicted values (also of size n), we
have: $’’’’&
’’’’%
MAEpyˆ,ytrueq
def
=
1
n
.
nÿ
i“1
∣
∣yˆi´ y
true
i
∣
∣
MAPEpyˆ,ytrueq
def
=
1
n
.
nÿ
i“1
∣
∣
∣
∣
yˆi´ y
true
i
ytruei
∣
∣
∣
∣
As we can see from the table II, the neural
networks achieve great performance. They are
able to predict the output of the load-flow with
an error close to 1% for the 30 buses grid and
around 2% for the 118 buses, which is enough for
looking at curative actions, as one will see in the
next section. We must note that no special care
have been taken to feed the data in the neural
network. Further studies will focus on the matter.
Variable 30 buses 118 buses
MAE (MAPE) MAE (MAPE)
cv (V) 19 (0.02%) 190 (0.01%)
pq (MVAr) 1.75 (1.50%) 16.6 (1.81 %)
fA (A) 8.63 (1.23%) 62.1 (2.3 %)
fMW (MW) 0.7 (0.76%) 7.4 (1.12%)
Table II: Mean absolution error (MAE) and mean
relative percentage error (MAPE) for each of the
output of the learning algorithm. The value are
computed over the entire test set from data never
seen during the training. The lines correspond to: cv
the voltages of the bus where the load is connected,
pq the reactive power produce by a plant, fA the
current flow on a line, and fMW the active power
flow on a line.
We believe that this could greatly improve the
performance.
To be complete, training the model for the 30
buses grid took 18h 31min on a computer with
an high-end GPU (Nvidia GTX 1080) and 20h
03min (in this case, the error was still decreasing
when at the time of writing). Once the model are
trained, the computation of load-flow is very fast.
Computing 5 000 security analysis for the "N-
1" criterion for the 30 buses grid (210 000 load-
flows) took only 1.56s on an intel i5 2 cores laptop
processor. For comparison, generating the dataset
using a much faster i7 processor took 123.7s. This
lead to computation time speed-up of around 80.
Concerning the 118 buses the speed-up is about
450 (1 432s to generate the data and 3.01s to com-
pute 2 500 security analysis, representing 450 000
load-flows using the trained model).
The main drawback of this method consist in the
fixed topology settings.Only lines disconnection
are taken into account. It is for now impossible
to perform more complex topological changes on
the power grid. We are currently working on this
issue, and preliminary results seems promising.
Even with more complex topological changes, the
error is around 2´ 3% for the 30 buses grid. No
experiment have been done concerning the 118
buses grid yet. Once such a model will be available,
we will be able to run the algorithms 1 and 2 with
the standard "N-1" security criterion. This could
also allow us to test more topological changes.
In summary, drastically reducing the computation
time could allow us to find more historical curative
actions.
After building such a data base of curative
actions, the next step will be to learn to mimic the
human. The encouraging performance of artificial
neural network in various supervised learning set-
ting. The first encouraging results concerning flows
approximations made us optimistic regarding the
possibility to predict, based on human decisions,
the substation for which we topology must be
changed for security issue. The training of this
model will be made with the data obtain after
running algorithm 2. The remedial action from
which the algorithm will learn will concern the
unsafe grid gˆt,h. That’s where the time window
hmax play an important role. The time interval must
be long enough to capture some possible remedial
action, but narrow enough such that the grid gˆt,h
is "realistic" (eg that this simulated grid state is
"close" enough to a grid that could have happened
in real time). That’s why we did not compute all
the grid in the interval t 5 mins, . . . , 24 hours u:
so grid where completely unrealistic. For example
applying the injections plan of peak time over the
grid topology that was in operation at lowest load
level often results in divergence of the load-flow.
V. LINKS WITH OPERATIONAL DECISION
PROCESSES
In this section, we will explain our view about
the possible usage of our method as a tool to help
the real time operations.
Let’s consider that we have at our disposal the
models discussed in the previous section:
M1 which approximate a load-flow computation
very rapidly
M2 that is able, given a safety issue and a grid
state to predict accurately on which substation
we can act.
First, as the grid evolve the Model 1 and Model
2 describe above could be learned from time to
time, for example during the week-end, or if a
greater computation power is available, during the
night if time allows it.
Then the future real time operation framework
could look like:
1) Use standard tools to assess whether or not a
grid is secure. This could be done with stan-
dard computation, such as a load-flow com-
putation and the "N-1" criterion. To speed-up
the computation, and get faster results, one
could also use model M1 to pre-screen the
contingencies that will most probably cause
at least one overload.
2) If there is some non secure contingency de-
tected, one could then use model M2 to pre-
dict on which substation a topological action
is worth looking for. Let’s name subi this
substations.
3) After such substation is detected, we could
enumerate all possible action doable at the
time of the study in subi. We could rapidly
assess if a possible curative action is found or
not.
4) Then are 2 cases:
‚ If a possible change has been found with
this method, we will use accurate model
such as load-flow as well as models that
take into account dynamic phenomenon to
check that the action found remove the
security issue, and that it does not cause
any problem elsewhere.
‚ Or no action have been found. In this case,
we let the operator the choice of which
action to do. But we can tell him that
it is most probably useless to seek for a
topological action in the substation subi.
As one can see, this framework offers a lot of
flexibility. One can for example decide at step 3
to look at the k "most likely" substations where
a topological curative action can take place. This
would of course increase the computation time,
but it will be more likely to find one. Also, this
method does allow for operators to take the control
at any moment. For example, it is always possible
to stop the research of curative actions, and the
algorithm will be able to tell which actions have
been (unsuccessfully) tested quite easily.
Most of all the security assessment can be per-
formed after the action have been chosen by the
machine, the fast approximation are only relevant
for exploring the curative actions space. Another
set of methods, including dynamic simulation of
the changes in the grid will take place after the
selection of the right action. The proposed method
is then a mixture of different approaches. We use
machine learning methods to search the curative
action. The security check are performed with very
well established method, relying on simulation of
physical systems.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper proposed to generate candidate re-
medial actions to dispatchers in order to maintain
a power network in ‘a safe state, using machine
learning techniques. With our method, remedial
actions are rank-orders in order of increasing cost
(costs for re-dispatching are typically much higher
than costs for modifying network topology) and
then tested with simulators used today by dispatch-
ers before being proposed to them. Our method-
ology requires first extracting from historical data
actual actions that were performed and have been
evaluated to have a positive influence (protect
against possible network issues to be avoided, such
as power flows exceeding lines thermal limits).
That alone is a non-trivial problem because (1)
many actions performed on the network are not
protective actions (they may include maintenance
actions and miscellaneous maneuvers); (2) there is
no centralized and uniform record of why given
actions are performed; (3) the consequences of not
performing given actions are not observed, hence
it is difficult to assess how effectively protective
given actions may be. We devised and imple-
mented an algorithm based on the causal concept
of counterfactuals, which allows us to identify
actions that have had beneficial effects (or more
precisely, without which the network would have
incurred adverse effects). Such training data will be
used to train learning machines in an supervised
way to imitate the actions of dispatchers or to
evaluate rapidly candidate actions. This allows us
to generalize and generate ranked lists of remedial
actions in situations never seen before. We tested
our method on small well-known test cases and
obtained promising preliminary results.
The proposed methodology counts multiple
advantages. The first one is to be able to explore
a vast number of possible curative actions, thanks
to the very fast approximation of flows. But
most importantly, we think that this method will
proposed realistic remedial actions thanks to
learning from operators expertise by observation.
Or methodology is to some extent inspired by
game playing machine learning programs such
as AlphaGo of Google Deepmind. [3]. Further
work will consist in learning using reinforcement
learning to refine our learning machine. In the
same manner than AlphaGo improved itself by
self-play, after being only initially trained to
imitate the play of famous Go players, we intend
to use the RTE simulator to generate millions
of new situations and let the learning machine
propose candidate remedial solutions and learn
from its errors to progressively improve (i.e.
decrease cumulative costs). In combination with
Monte Carlo Tree Search (as used by AlphaGo),
we believe that this could be a powerful way
of improving policy learning. Other avenues of
research include seeking the worst case events that
could happen after a remedial action took place,
following the work of[11] and [12], for example.
Another possible extension would be to used the
proposed framework in more generic settings in
the context of mid- to long-term studies, where
real-time actions must be taken into account (the
GARPUR2 project would be an example), or for
the classification of contingencies in the case of
the I-TESLA project3.
We also intend to explore many remedial action
recombination strategies to enrich the space of
exploration, in the spirit of genetic algorithms.
While our approach will initially draw on classi-
cal Markov Decision Processes, assuming largely
quasi-total observability of the grid state and dis-
patcher actions, we will progressively incorporate
more realism and complexity and devise methods
having only partial knowledge of the overall situ-
ation, which may occur in case of delayed infor-
mation transmission, and move into the realm of
more complex models such as Partially Observable
Markov Decision Processes (POMDP).
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